Russian propaganda flooded the Donbas region of Ukraine. Research study shows that Kremlin disinformation was not efficient.
A study of the propaganda that flooded Donbas for several years reveals a failure to develop pro-Russian “in-group” identities in the region, in spite of Vladimir Putins claims of assistance.
According to a research study of countless stories from media outlets churning out propaganda in Ukrainian Donbas following Russias very first intrusion, Kremlin disinformation has long disregarded any persuasive or meaningful narrative to establish support for Russia in the war-torn region.
After 2014, when news media in the so-called “Peoples Republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk was forcibly taken over by Russian-backed insurgents, efforts to impart a pro-Russian “identity” were half-baked and lazy, and faded away to nothing within months.
This is according to researcher Dr. Jon Roozenbeek, from the University of Cambridge, who says that– based upon his analysis of over 4 years of media content– such limited efforts likely had little effect on the awareness of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Donbas.
Vladimir Putin has actually long trumpeted the concept of “Novorossiya,” or “New Russia,” in an attempt to reanimate terms once used to describe Donbas throughout the reign of Catherine the Great, when it temporarily sat within the Russian Empire, and declare the area belongs in Russia.
While waves of propaganda demonized Ukraines government, the research study reveals that Novorossiya was hardly discussed, and Russian disinformation lacked any genuine “in-group” story, the “us” to oppose a “them”– a basic flaw in any attempt to produce long lasting division, states Roozenbeek.
Instead of identity-building, practically the entire Russian propaganda effort counted on portraying the leadership in Kyiv as fascistic– the basis of over-the-top “denazification” claims– to produce what psychologists call an “outgroup” on which to focus hostility.
However, as Russia moves its war onto Donbas, Roozenbeek warns that it may turn to spreading out Novorossiya-style propaganda narratives in the region and far beyond to validate land seizure and war atrocities, and claim that these actions are supported by local populations.
He requires a pre-emptive global debunking– or “pre-bunking”– of the idea that ideological jobs such as “Novorossiya” have deep roots in the area, and that the individuals of Donbas have ever purchased into these myths.
Otherwise, he says, we run the risk of such frauds taking hold in the West via pundits and political leaders who tow the Kremlin line. Roozenbeeks findings are now publicly offered for the very first time.
” Eight years of Russian propaganda have failed to supply a persuading option to Ukrainian nationhood in eastern Ukraine,” stated Roozenbeek.
” The Kremlins decision to favor outgroup animosity over in-group identity building, and its large overestimation of the level to which its lies about non-existent Ukrainian “fascists” promoted pro-Russian belief, are key reasons that the invasion has been a tactical and logistical disaster.”
” If the nonsense of Novorossiya or other half-baked ideological stories begin to spread out in the West, it might wind up being used to pressure Ukraine into giving up big swathes of its territory, as a drawn-out war in the Donbas triggers the global communitys nerves to fray,” he stated.
For his PhD research study, Roozenbeek used “natural language processing” to algorithmically comb through over 85,000 print and online short articles from 30 local and local media outlets throughout Luhansk and Donetsk in between 2014 and 2017, charting the patterns of content through usage of keywords and expressions in the wake of the very first Russian invasion of Ukraine.
While half the protection in print media stayed “service as normal”– sport, home entertainment, etc– some 36% was dedicated to the “shaping of identity” through propaganda. Much of this was done through parallels to World War II: the Donbas war as an attack by Ukrainian “neo-Nazis.”.
Just one paper paid any attention to Putins adopted idea of “Novorossiya.” Obvious chances to take advantage of history for identity-building propaganda were missed out on, such the truth that part of Donbas declared itself a Soviet republic in 1918, or indeed any reference of the Soviet Union.
” Descriptions of an in-group identity that positioned Donbas as part of the “Russian World” were almost completely absent from the regions print media,” stated Roozenbeek.
This pattern was mainly replicated in online news media, which were arguably more ferocious in efforts to demonize the “outgroup” Kyiv government– consisting of using English language to spread and attempt propaganda worldwide– while disregarding a pro-Russian “this is us” identity.
Roozenbeek discovered a handful of stories covering “patriotic” cultural events arranged by the Kremlin-owned management in Luhansk, however even here the in-group identity was “slackly presumed,” he states, rather than developed.
All this in spite of the truth that a “blueprint” technique for propaganda in Donbas explicitly called for the image of a good-hearted Russia to be cultivated by highlighting the “Russian World” philosophy.
This strategy, leaked to German papers in 2016, is widely believed to be the work of Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlins former propagandist-in-chief, typically dubbed Putins puppet master. It describes the need to construct and promote an ideology of “cultural sovereignty” in Russian-occupied Donbas, one that can serve as a stepping stone to statehood.
” Despite the significance provided to building identity and ideology after the Russian-backed takeover in Luhansk and Donetsk, consisting of as directed by the Kremlin, very little in-group identity was promoted,” said Roozenbeek.
” What identity-building propaganda I could find in Donbas after 2014 was vague, improperly developed, and rapidly forgotten. Political attempts to invoke Novorossiya were cast aside by the summertime of 2015, but such weak propaganda recommends they didnt stand much chance anyhow.”.
” Putin has significantly undervalued the strength of Ukrainian national identity, even in Donbas, and overestimated the power of his propaganda machine on the occupied locations of Ukraine.”.
Roozenbeeks research study for his PhD was carried out between 2016 and 2020, and will feature in his upcoming book Influence, Information and War in Ukraine, due out next year as part of the Society for the Psychology Study of Social Issues book series Contemporary Social Issues, released by Cambridge University Press.
” What identity-building propaganda I could discover in Donbas after 2014 was vague, inadequately conceived, and quickly forgotten.”– Jon Roozenbeek
